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PRIVATE REGIMES
PUBLIC SPHERE
IN THE
OPTIMIZ ING THE BENEFITS OF  
COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES
Common interest communities have  
become more accessible since the founding  
of gramercy Park in manhattan in 1831— 
the first homeowner association, whose 
members still enjoy exclusive use of the  
2-acre green space they privately maintain.  
Credit: © aa World travel library / alamy (top),  
trust for architectural Easements (bottom)
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by Gerald Korngold
A New Yorker cartoon by Jack Ziegler captures  
the essential irony of buying into condominiums, 
cooperatives, and other homeowner associations. 
A car is entering a driveway that leads to a group 
of townhouses in the distance, and a sign by the 
entrance proclaims, “Welcome to Condoville  
and the Illusion of Owning Your Own Property”  
(Ziegler 1984).
 Despite this ambiguity, about a quarter of  
the American population now lives in association 
housing situations, collectively known as 
common interest communities (CICs). Figure 1 
shows the tremendous increase in CICs over  
the past several decades. From 1970 to 2013,  
the number of housing units in such communities 
spiked from about 700,000 to 26.3 million, while 
the number of residents multiplied more than 
30-fold from 2.1 million to 65.7 million. 
 With their growing popularity, common 
interest communities have raised policy chal-
lenges and legal issues that require ongoing 
resolution. These conflicts generally reflect 
either external concerns that CICs segregate  
the wealthy from the rest of society or internal 
disagreements between individual owners and 
their associations’ governing bodies. This article 
examines some of the controversies associated 
with the CIC model and its governance, and 
suggests approaches for enhancing the benefits 
of common interest communities for both 
property owners and society at large. 
The Rise of Common Interest 
Communities
With increasing industrialization during the 19th 
century, the intrusion of pollution, traffic, noise, 
and disease led many planners and citizens to 
favor the separation of residential, commercial, 
and industrial uses. (Zoning had not yet emerged 
as a planning tool and would not be validated by 
the Supreme Court of the United States until 
1926.) Some residential developers thus imposed 
“servitudes”—covenants, restrictions, and 
easements—on their subdivision projects. 
Servitudes generally restricted the properties to 
residential uses and often created shared rights 
to communal facilities and services in exchange 
for fees. Lot purchasers agreed to the servitudes, 
and once the restrictions were recorded, subse-
quent purchasers were also legally bound. The 
common law proved to be an effective vehicle for 
creating high-end residential areas, including 
New York City’s Gramercy Park (1831) and 
Boston’s Louisburg Square (1844).
 After a slowdown during the Great Depression 
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and World War II, construction of CICs began to 
boom in the late 1960s, after the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) recognized the condomini-
um as an insurable ownership vehicle, and state 
statutory authorization followed. FHA mortgage 
insurance encouraged developers to build 
middle-class condominiums, which gained 
market acceptance as a result of the “new town” 
movement—exemplified by early planned 
communities such as Reston, Virginia (1964),  
and Columbia, Maryland (1967). The passage of 
California’s Proposition 13, the initiative that 
and subject to the law of contract rather than 
public administrative and Constitutional law  
(see Box 1). 
Economic Benefits of CICs 
CICs bring substantial economic benefits to 
owners and to society at large. Residents who buy 
into these communities have determined that 
shared facilities, such as recreational areas, are a 
better value than, say, personal swimming pools 
and other private facilities. Similarly, those joining 
CICs have determined that certain restrictions—
such as a prohibition on parking mobile homes in 
driveways—increase property values. 
 These communities help to achieve efficient 
use of land as well. The costs of organizing and 
administering a private residential community 
are lower than in a public system (Nelson 2009). 
Transaction costs and rent-seeking through the 
political system are also reduced. Finally, 
because it is free from statutory and constitu-
tional restraints, a private community has greater 
flexibility in the substance of its rules and 
operations, freeing it from adherence to public 
guidelines when entering into contracts with 
service providers and suppliers. 
 American courts have recognized these 
efficiency benefits when enforcing CIC arrange-
limited property taxation in 1978, and similar 
measures in other states also spurred an increase 
in CICs, as cash-strapped local governments, 
under increased pressure to provide more 
services, were unwilling to absorb the infrastruc-
ture and service costs from new development.  
As a result, they tended to approve new develop-
ments only in CIC form, where the developer  
(and ultimately the owners) covered the costs. 
 Today, CIC owners are generally subject to a 
variety of constraints related to their private 
units, from limitations on the layout and design 
of buildings and the type of construction 
materials used, to restrictions on visible home 
decorations, ancillary structures, and landscap-
ing. There are often controls on the owner’s 
behavior and use of the property, which is 
typically limited to residential occupancy. Noise, 
parking, and traffic rules may also be imposed, 
along with vehicle restrictions. In some cases, 
political signs, leafleting, and related activities 
are also prohibited. 
 In exchange for their association dues, 
owners have access to common facilities, such 
as roads and recreational areas, and to private 
services, such as security, trash collection, street 
cleaning, and snow plowing. The CIC is usually 
administered by a private residential government 
and various committees, elected by the owners 
A quarter of the American population now 
lives in common interest communities.
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ments and the owners’ reliance on them. As  
one court noted, “It is a well-known fact that 
[covenants] enhance the value of the subdivision 
property and form an inducement for purchasers 
to buy lots within the subdivision” (Gunnels v.  
No. Woodland Community Ass’n, Tex. Ct. App, 
17013 [1978]).
External Concerns: Secession 
from the General Community
Despite these benefits, various commentators 
have argued that the services and private 
facilities of CICs are available only to those who 
can afford them and facilitate the separation of 
the wealthy from the rest of society. The rest of  
a CIC’s municipality is forced to do without, 
creating a permanent, two-tier system of housing. 
Critics also claim that privatization of infrastruc-
ture and services isolates CIC residents and 
reduces their stake in broad communal issues. 
 By this logic, CIC dwellers are less willing to 
engage with public government on civic matters 
and more likely to resist tax increases, given that 
the CIC rather than the municipal government 
provides many services. Where community 
associations are part of suburban developments, 
isolation from the urban core may be acute.  
These concerns often center on a fear of class 
and economic segregation. As former Secretary  
of Labor Robert Reich wrote in a New York Times 
article called “Secession of the Successful”: In 
many cities and towns, the wealthy have in effect 
withdrawn their dollars from the support of public 
spaces and institutions shared by all and dedicat-
ed the savings to their own private services. . . . 
Condominiums and the omnipresent residential 
communities dun their members to undertake 
work that financially strapped local governments 
can no longer afford to do well (Reich 1991).
FREEDOM OF CHOICE
This characterization of community associations, 
however, is at odds with the fundamental 
American values of freedom of contract and 
freedom of association. It is a shared value that 
people may spend their money for lawful 
BOx 1 
COMMON INTEREST COMMuNITY MODELS 
CICs typically create a private government  
elected by the owners to administer and enforce 
contracts, and to promulgate rules to advance 
community interests. While the exact form of  
the arrangement may vary, the basic concepts  
are similar. 
Homeowner Associations
Unit owners hold fee title to their individual 
properties, which are usually single-family or 
townhouse homes. The association holds title to 
common areas and grants the owners easement 
rights for their use. These can be created by 
common law or under statutes in some states. 
Homeowner associations make up more than  
half of community associations nationally. 
Condominiums
Unit owners receive fee title to their units plus  
a percentage ownership in the common areas.  
The association administers the common areas 
but does not hold title to them. Condominiums 
may be vertical (high-rise) or horizontal (single- 
family or townhouse homes), and they are  
created exclusively pursuant to state statute. 
Condominiums represent 45 to 48 percent of 
community associations. 
Cooperatives
A cooperative corporation owns the building,  
and the owners receive shares in the corporation 
and automatically renewable, long-term leases  
on their individual units. Unlike condominium  
and homeowner associations, the corporation  
can control transfer of leases and shares  
by cooperative owners. Only 3 to 4 percent  
of community associations are organized  
as cooperatives. 
Middle-class condominiums gained market acceptance  
in the 1960s, as a result of early planned communities  
such as Reston, Virginia. Credit: BB_Image / iStock
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purposes as they wish and enter into contracts 
as they please. The law intrudes on freedom of 
contract only in rare instances when major policy 
considerations are at stake. Courts have recog-
nized freedom of contract as an important 
consideration for upholding private servitude 
arrangements: We start with the proposition that 
private persons, in the exercise of their constitu-
tional right of freedom of contract, may impose 
whatever restrictions upon the use of land which 
they convey to another that they desire to impose 
(Grubel v. McLaughlin, D. Va. [1968]).
tions Institute, 64 percent of owners were positive 
about their overall experience, and 26 percent 
were neutral. While 86 percent of respondents 
indicated that they wanted either less or no 
additional governmental regulation, 70 percent 
maintained that association rules and restrictions 
protect and enhance property values. 
THE ISSuE OF DOuBLE TAxATION
While the rise of CICs reflects a variety of factors, 
the constrained finances of municipalities 
following the property tax revolts in the 1970s 
were key. In fact, a different take on the “seces-
sion” narrative is that some owners in common 
interest communities believe that municipal 
government abandoned them. 
 CIC owners pay property taxes at the same 
rates as other citizens, even though they 
privately purchase services such as trash 
collection, street cleaning, and security with their 
community association dues. This amounts to 
double taxation, charging association owners for 
a service they are not receiving. 
  If a no-service policy were in effect before  
an owner purchased a unit in a CIC, theoretically 
the buyer could lower the offer price to reflect 
the lack of municipal services and the dou-
ble-taxation-effect. The unit owner would be 
protected, and the developer would absorb the 
loss. But if a municipality reduces services but 
not taxes after the unit purchase, the owner 
suffers an uncompensated loss. This outcome 
would be bad policy in that it permits rent 
seeking, allowing the majority of citizens in the 
town to select one group of residents to bear an 
extra tax burden even though they do not create 
extra costs. This offends notions of both fairness 
and efficiency, and it’s antithetical to community 
building and civic trust. 
 It is especially important for legislatures to 
avoid the use of double taxation as a matter of 
policy, given that judicial challenges are unlikely 
to succeed. The few courts that have entertained 
attacks on double taxation have been unsympa-
thetic to claims that it violates due process of  
law, offends the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution, or works a taking of property 
without compensation. While double taxation may 
CIC owners pay property taxes at the  
same rates as other citizens, even though 
they privately purchase services such as 
trash collection, street cleaning, and  
security with their community association 
dues. This amounts to double taxation.
 CICs also reflect the American belief in 
freedom of association, exemplified in a long 
tradition of utopian communities and other 
belief-centered networks. Residents in modern 
CICs might share common interests, such as the 
homeowners living in golf or equestrian commu-
nities. Other residents may simply share a desire 
for neighborhood tranquility or character. In 
Behind the Gates, Setha Low suggests that CICs 
allow “middle-class families [to] imprint their 
residential landscapes with ‘niceness,’ reflecting 
their own aesthetic of orderliness, consistency, 
and control” (Low 2004). Whatever the reason, 
community associations are consistent with de 
Tocqueville’s observation about American 
interactions: Americans of all ages, all conditions, 
and all dispositions, constantly form associations. 
They have not only commercial and manufacturing 
companies, in which all take part, but associations 
of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, 
serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous  
or diminutive (de Tocqueville 1835).
 Moreover, the available evidence indicates 
that CIC residents are generally happy with their 
choice. In a 2014 survey conducted by Public 
Opinion Strategies for the Community Associa-
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be bad policy, it is not unconstitutional. The courts 
should not overturn such legislative decisions,  
because these are essentially political outcomes 
that the public should challenge at the ballot box. 
THE QuESTION OF INEQuALITY
The “secession of the wealthy” argument appears 
to be based on the notion that only higher-income 
owners with higher-value homes live in common 
interest communities. The available data, 
however, do not clearly support this assumption. 
As Figure 2 indicates, prices for condominiums 
and cooperatives—half of the units in CICs 
nationally—are below those for all existing 
homes (including condominiums, cooperatives, 
and single-family homes inside and outside of 
community associations). While these estimates 
are not deeply segmented (for example, they do 
not break out single-family homes inside and 
outside CICs), they do show that the values of 
condominiums and cooperatives are consistent 
with those of homes generally. 
 Housing affordability and access are signifi-
cant challenges in the United States, but 
community associations are not necessarily the 
cause of these deep-seated, complex problems. 
Employed before CICs became popular, exclu-
sionary zoning imposed by local governments in 
the form of large lot requirements has prevented 
developers from building affordable housing. 
CICs have in fact been found to lower the costs  
of home purchases. Multi-unit housing, such  
as condominiums and townhouses, is more 
affordable than single-family homes because  
it cuts the cost of land, infrastructure, and 
building (Ellickson & Been 2005). Affordable 
housing cooperatives permit restrictions on 
resale prices and owner income, thus ensuring 
that housing opportunities remain available for 
lower-income families. For these purposes, 
developers operating under city requirements  
or incentives often designate condominium units 
within a project as affordable units.
All Single Family Condos/Coops All Single Family Condos/Coops
2008 $198,100 $196,600 $209,800 $242,700 $241,700 $250,500
2009 $172,500 $172,100 $175,600 $216,900 $217,000 $216,300
2010 $172,900 $173,100 $171,700 $220,000 $220,600 $215,700
2011 $166,100 $166,200 $165,100 $214,000 $214,300 $211,300
2012 $176,800 $177,200 $173,700 $225,400 $225,800 $222,200
2013 $197,100 $197,400 $194,900 $245,000 $245,700 $244,300
mEan mEdian
Source: Clifford J. Treese, Association Data, Inc., compiled from National Association of Realtors Data
FIGURE 2 
ExISTING HOME PRICES 2008–2013
Affordable housing cooperatives permit 
restrictions on resale prices and owner 
income, thus ensuring that housing 
opportunities remain available for lower-
income families.
 It is therefore simplistic and counterproduc-
tive to see community associations as a battle-
ground between rich and poor. Similarly,  
pejorative use of the term “gated” communities 
to describe those CICs with limited public access 
does not advance understanding. Indeed, a 
moderate-income cooperative with a front door 
locked for basic security reasons falls within the 
definition of a “gated” community. 
20      LAND LINES
GuIDING PRINCIPLES
In what ways should the “secession of the 
successful” critique affect our understanding, 
acceptance, and authorization of common 
interest communities? The issue is complex and 
does not lend itself to binary choices. Instead,  
it is a matter of accommodating competing 
interests according to the following principles:
•	 Acceptance of the CIC model has increased 
over time. These types of housing arrange-
ments represent the free choice of many 
people, and the law enforces their contracts  
in most instances. 
•	 CIC owners should relate to the municipal 
government and the CIC structure under what 
might be termed “augmented federalism.” 
Under this notion, residents have additional 
contractual duties to the CIC, but these 
obligations do not excuse them from duties to 
and participation in federal, state, and local 
governments. In return, legislators should base 
policy decisions affecting CIC owners on 
considerations of fairness, efficiency, and 
community building. 
•	 Housing access and affordability require 
comprehensive solutions. These issues should 
be discussed and debated directly, and the 
political process should determine the course 
of action. Viewing these issues only as a CIC 
problem is unwarranted and will not bring 
effective results.
Internal Conflicts: Individual 
Owners vs. the Community
In his groundbreaking book Privatopia: Homeown-
er Associations and the Rise of Private Residen-
tial Governments (1996), Evan McKenzie warned 
that: CICs feature a form of private government 
that takes an American preference for private 
home ownership and, too often, turns it into an 
ideology of hostile privatism. Preservation of 
property values is the highest social goal, to which 
other aspects of community life are subordinated. 
Rigid, intrusive, and often petty rule enforcement 
makes a caricature of . . . benign management, 
and the belief in rational planning is distorted into 
BOx 2
CONFLICTS MAkE GOOD COPY
While the following headlines fail to represent the 
myriad positive interactions between individual 
owners and associations, they do suggest some of the 
difficult interactions that can occur. 
•	 “Marine’s Parents Sued Over Sign of Support in 
Their Bossier City [La.] Front Yard.” The 3 ft. x 6 ft. 
sign displayed a picture of their son in uniform, 
before deployment to Afghanistan, with text that 
read, “Our son defends our freedom” (Associated 
Press, July 25, 2011).
•	 “Bucks County Woman Fined by Homeowners’ 
Association For Colored Christmas Lights.” 
Association members had previously voted in favor 
of permitting white lights only (CBS Philly, 
December 2, 2011).
•	 “Dallas Man Suing Rabbi Neighbor Who Uses House 
as a Synagogue.” The plaintiff claimed that the use 
of the home for a 25-person congregation violated 
the residential restriction (KDFW Fox4 Online, 
February 4, 2014).
•	 “A Grandfather Is Doing Time For Ignoring A Judge’s 
Order in a Dispute Over Resodding His Yard.” The 
association won a judgment of $795 against the 
owner who claimed that he could not afford to 
resod his browning lawn. When the owner failed to 
pay, the court jailed him for contempt (St. Peters-
burg Times, October 10, 2008).
•	 “Hilton Head Plantation Resident Disputes Gate 
Toll for Unpaid Fees.” An owner brought suit after an 
association imposed a $10 entrance gate fee on 
homeowners delinquent on their annual associa-
tion dues (Island Packet, August 29, 2014).
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an emphasis on conformity for its own sake.
 Conflicts between residents and CIC associa-
tions or boards often revolve around two general 
issues: the substance of the restrictions and the 
procedures for enforcement (see Box 2). As Figure 
3 shows, disputes may focus on a range of topics, 
from landscaping restrictions to assessment 
collection. Indeed, 24 percent of CIC residents 
responding to the 2014 Public Opinion Strategies 
survey had experienced a significant personal 
issue or disagreement with their associations.  
Of this group, 52 percent were satisfied with the 
outcome and 36 percent were dissatisfied; in 12 
percent of cases, the issue was still unresolved. 
 There are indeed certain risks that community 
associations can overstep with respect to the 
substance and enforcement of restrictions, but 
legislation and judicial supervision can address 
these substantive and procedural policy concerns.
FREEDOM OF CHOICE
As discussed earlier, individuals exercise their 
freedom of choice by purchasing homes in CICs 
and agreeing to be subject to their rules. Associa-
tion living may not be for everyone, but the 
expectation of people who choose the CIC life 
should generally be respected and not be 
frustrated by someone who subsequently seeks 
to violate the compact. The courts generally 
reflect this view, as suggested by this 1981 ruling:
[The original] restrictions are clothed with a very 
strong presumption of validity which arises from 
the fact that each individual unit owner purchas-
es his unit knowing and accepting the restrictions 
to be imposed. . . . [A] use restriction in a declara-
tion of condominium may have a certain degree of 
unreasonableness to it, and yet withstand attack 
in the courts. If it were otherwise, a unit owner 
could not rely on the restrictions found in the 
declaration . . . since such restrictions would be in 
a potential condition of continuous flux (Hidden 
Harbour Estates v. Basso, Fla. Ct. App. [1981]). 
 There are several scenarios, though, where 
homeowners may have no freedom of choice. 
First, it is possible that the only new housing 
available to buyers would be in CICs—i.e., 
developers are no longer building new homes 
outside of associations. Indeed, a recent report 
The owner of this home in St. Petersburg, Florida, ended up in 
jail for refusal to resod his browning lawn or pay the resulting 
$795 fine from his homeowner association. Credit: © Lance Aram 
Rothstein/Tampa Bay Times/ZUMA Press
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found that in 2003, 80 percent of all homes being 
built at that time were in associations (Founda-
tion for Community Association Research 2014). 
In addition, municipal government may require 
developers to create associations as a condition 
for subdivision approval. (Recent legislation in 
Arizona prohibiting this practice indicates that it 
still occurs.) Finally, some courts have suggested 
that while rules in place at the time of purchase 
should be enforced, a rule subsequently enacted 
ities) from one owner to the rest of the communi-
ty. They should not, however, enforce restrictions 
that limit the nature or status of the occupants  
or the behavior within a unit that does not create 
externalities. This approach is based on the 
theory that the primary purpose of CIC regimes  
is to enhance economic value and encourage 
efficient exchanges. Thus, if the owner creates  
no externalities, the courts should not enforce 
bans on the particular behavior. Moreover, some 
values of personal autonomy are too important 
and trump the usual rules of contract. We do not, 
for example, permit contracts of indentured 
servitude or the sale of human organs. 
 By this standard, limiting noise and banning 
smoking (because of seepage of odors) in 
multi-family units would be legitimate, but 
restrictions based on the marital status of 
residents would not. Some situations are 
trickier—for example, restrictions on pets. Under 
the suggested guidelines, it would usually be 
legitimate to bar pets because of the potential 
noise and the reluctance of some residents to 
share common areas with them. In the case of 
service animals, however, the unit owner’s health 
needs may trump community concerns.
 First Amendment–type issues present  
special challenges. Free expression—such as 
political or issue-related signage, leafleting, 
demonstrations, or other manifestations—can 
cause spillovers that may include noise, aesthetic 
interference, and disruption of the community’s 
general ambience. At the same time, however, free 
speech is fundamental to our republican form of 
government, arguably whether it is addressed to 
the larger public government or the private 
government. In expression cases, courts might 
apply the longstanding doctrine that prohibits 
covenants that violate public policy, rejecting 
total bans on speech in favor of reasonable 
restrictions on time, place, and manner. This 
would allow expression but limit, if not eliminate, 
spillover on the community. 
 Religious freedom is another fundamental 
American value. Restrictions on the placement  
of a mezuzah on doorposts and the display of 
crèches, statues of saints, and Christmas lights 
limit free exercise of religion. While it would open 
Association restrictions raise concerns when 
they threaten the personal autonomy and 
fundamental individual rights of owners. 
by the association or board under a reserved 
power should not be enforced if an owner can 
show that it is “unreasonable.” Other courts 
disagree: Homeowner should not be heard to 
complain when, as anticipated by the recorded 
declaration of covenants, the homeowners’ 
association amends the declaration. When a 
purchaser buys into such a community, the 
purchaser buys not only subject to the express 
covenants in the declaration, but also subject  
to the amendment provisions. . . . And, of course,  
a potential homeowner concerned about commu-
nity association governance has the option to 
purchase a home not subject to association 
governance. . . . For this reason, we decline to 
subject the amendments . . . to the “reasonable-
ness” test (Hughes v. New Life Development  
Corp., Tenn. Sup. Ct. [2012]). 
Guidelines for Protecting 
Personal Autonomy
Association restrictions raise concerns when they 
threaten the personal autonomy and fundamental 
individual rights of owners. Constraints of this 
type might include prohibitions of political signs 
or messaging, and restriction of occupancy to 
“traditional” families. 
 Courts should enforce restrictions if they 
limit spillovers (also known as fallout or external-
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a Pandora’s box to engage in balancing the 
religious importance of colored versus white 
Christmas lights against CIC standards, it would 
nevertheless be appropriate for the courts to 
impose a general standard of reasonable 
accommodation on CIC regulations that affect  
religious practices. 
 Finally, in the development and enforcement 
of association rules, CIC property owners have a 
right to expect certain behavior from associa-
tions and boards. This expectation traces from 
the obligation of good faith and fair dealing that 
is incumbent on all parties to a contract. Thus,  
an owner should have a right to fair procedures, 
including notice and an opportunity to be heard; 
to be treated equally to other similarly situated 
owners; and to be free from bias, personal 
animus, and bad-faith decision making by the 
board and its members. 
Conclusion
Common interest communities are a large part  
of the American residential landscape, currently 
providing homes for a quarter of the U.S. 
population. While CICs bring great economic 
advantages to residents and society in general, 
these types of housing arrangements do require 
nuanced interactions between the community 
association and the municipal government, and 
association rules can impinge on the personal 
autonomy of members. However, strategies are 
available to mitigate if not overcome these 
problems. Indeed, these approaches can make 
ownership of a home in a CIC less of an illusion 
and more of a reality.  
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